基于利他偏好的电商供应链最优决策与契约协调

构建了由一个占主导地位的电商平台和一个处于跟随地位的制造商组成的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,研究了电商平台有无利他偏好时电商供应链的最优决策和契约协调问题,并通过数值算例验证了本文的主要结论.研究表明:电商平台的利他偏好行为能够促使自身服务水平提高、正向影响制造商的最优销售价格并削弱自身利润.但电商平台的让利行为能够提高制造商的利润水平、缓和供应链冲突并改善供应链整体绩效."销售佣金比例+服务成本共担"契约能够完美的协调电商供应链,使双方最优利润获得帕累托改进,从而保证电商平台有足够的激励执行利他偏好行为.另外,进一步分析发现电商平台的利他偏好正向影响制造商支付给电商平台的固定技术服务费、制造商占有的电商供应链利润份额和服务成本分担比例,负向影响自身的销售佣金比例.

Optimal Decision and Contract Coordination of E-commerce Supply Chain based on Altruistic Preference

A Stackelberg master-slave game model composed of a dominant e-commerce platform and a manufacturer in the following position was constructed.The optimal decision and contract coordination of e-commerce supply chain was studied with or without altruistic preference,and the main conclusions of this paper were verified through numerical examples.The research shows that the altruistic preference behavior of e-commerce platform can promote the improvement of its own service level,positively affect the optimal selling price of manufacturer and weaken its own profit.However,the profit-giving behavior of e-commerce platform can improve the profit level of manufacturer,alleviate the conflicts in the supply chain and improve the overall performance of the supply chain.The contract of"sales commission ratio+service cost sharing"can perfectly coordinate the e-commerce supply chain,so that the optimal profits of both parties achieve Pareto improvement,thus ensure that the e-commerce platform has sufficient incentives to carry out altruistic preference behaviors.In addition,further analysis shows that the altruistic preference of e-commerce platform positively affects the fixed technical service fee paid to e-commerce platform by manufacturer,the supply chain profit share and service cost sharing ratio of manufacturer,and negatively affects his own sales commission ratio.