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防范经理事后隐藏信息的模型研究
引用本文:张勇.防范经理事后隐藏信息的模型研究[J].数学的实践与认识,2007,37(20):113-120.
作者姓名:张勇
作者单位:西南科技大学,经济管理学院,四川,绵阳,621002
摘    要:首先,指出了经理隐匿信息的道德风险行为对所有者的危害性.其次,构造了一个防范经理在签约后隐匿信息的报酬契约.再次,在委托代理框架下给出了契约的最优解.最后,分析了最优契约的特征与性质.文章得到的一些结论对经理选任聘任机制和报酬激励机制的设计有一定的参考价值.

关 键 词:隐匿信息的道德风险  防范  最优报酬契约
修稿时间:2004年9月23日

An Optimal Reward Contracts That can be Against the Manager's Moral Hazard with Hidden Information
ZHANG Yong.An Optimal Reward Contracts That can be Against the Manager''''s Moral Hazard with Hidden Information[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2007,37(20):113-120.
Authors:ZHANG Yong
Abstract:Firstly,it pointed out that the manager′s moral hazard with hidden information would be harmfulness to enterprise-owner.Second,it designed a reward contract that could be against hidden information after the manager signed the contract.Third,it gived out optimal solution in principal-agent framework.Finally, it analyzed the characteristic and the kind of the optimal contracts.Some conclusions get of this article would help the research of choosing manager and encourage manager.
Keywords:moral hazard with hidden information  be on guard  optimal reward contract
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