可交易的水权安排对农户灌溉用水行为的影响——基于农户行为模型的理论分析

水资源用水总量控制与定额管理相结合的制度已成为我国水法的重要制度.但目前我国用水定额管理工作仅强调了通过用水定额管理并结合价格机制实行超定额累进加价征收水资源费和水费的办法来激励人们节约用水,没有明确界定这些用水定额的产权归属问题及用水定额的可交易性问题.将通过建立农户灌溉用水行为模型,利用边际分析方法分析可交易的农业用水定额对农户行为的影响.分析表明,当水权可交易时,水价政策与水市场的存在将激励农户节约用水,减少灌溉用水量.农户将通过采用灌溉效率更高的灌溉技术来节约单位面积的灌溉用水量或通过改变种植面积或种植结构的方式来节约总的灌溉用水量,而种植面积或种植结构的变化将进一步促进农地流转市场的发展.但水权交易成本的增加可能削弱出售水权农户的节水积极性并影响农户参与水市场的积极性从而影响水市场的形成与发展.

Effects of Tradeable Water Rights on Farmers' Irrigation Water Use Behaviour

The combination of total water use control and water quota management has been an important institution in China.Nowadays the water quota management only emphasize on encouraging people to save water use through water quota management combine with price mechanism but do not clearly define the property rights and the tradability of water quota.The paper analysed the effects of tradeable water rights on farmers' irrigation water use behaviour based on farmers' behaviour models and marginal analysis.The results show that water price policies and water market may encourage farmers to save water and reduce irrigation water use.Farmers may adopt irrigation technology with high efficiency to save water use per hectare or change the planting area or structure to save the total water use,which may further promote the development of local land market.But the transaction costs of water trade may attenuate the water sellers' willingness to save water and also has an impact on farmers' willingness to participate in the water market which may influence the formation and the development of water market.