逆向选择下的委托—代理模型分析

分别讨论了在对称信息和逆向选择下,保险代理人的类型是离散和连续情形时激励合同设计问题,得出如下主要结论:保险人在对称信息和逆向选择下要求最高效率的代理人的努力水平相同,且在逆向选择下的支付更多,然而对其他类型的代理人而言,在逆向选择下要求的努力水平和所支付比在对称信息条件下都要少些.

An Analysis of Principal-agent Model under Ad verse Selection

This paper discusses the mechanism design problem for discrete and continuous agent types under symmetric information and adverse selection separately,some important conclusions have been drawn: the effort that the insurer demands of the most efficient agent is the same under adverse selection as symmetric information and pays more under adverse selection. However,from all other agents,the insurer demands less effort and pays less under adverse selection than symmetric information.