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有限合作博弈的Shapley分配
引用本文:李书金,郦晓宁.有限合作博弈的Shapley分配[J].数学的实践与认识,2011,41(19).
作者姓名:李书金  郦晓宁
作者单位:1. 中央司法警官学院研究所,河北保定,071000
2. 中央司法警官学院劳教管理系,河北保定,071000
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“基于可信性理论的动态投资组合模型及决策研究”(70871011)
摘    要:以Myerson关于有限合作的图博弈模型为基础,结合经典合作博弈的相关结论,建立了有限合作博弈的Shapley分配,讨论了分配的相关性质.同时在支付函数满足链递增性的假设下,进一步研究了有限合作关系变化对收益分配的影响,给出了相关的研究结论.

关 键 词:有限合作博弈  Shapley值  递增支付  

The Shapley Value for Restricted Cooperative Games
LI Shu-jin,LI Xiao-ning.The Shapley Value for Restricted Cooperative Games[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2011,41(19).
Authors:LI Shu-jin  LI Xiao-ning
Institution:LI Shu-jin~1,LI Xiao-ning~2 (1.Research Institute,The Central Institute for Correctional Police,Baoding 071000,China) (2.Department of Correctional Education,China)
Abstract:Based on the model of restricted cooperative games established by Myerson and the conclusions relative to crisp cooperative games,the Shapley value for restricted cooperative games is proposed,and the related properties are proved as well.On the assumption that payoff function increase as the links get more,influences to the allocation of profit is analyzed,and the research conclusions are given.
Keywords:restricted cooperative game  shapley value  increasing payoff  link  
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