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| 基于演化博弈的发电侧电力市场长期均衡模型 | |
| 引用本文： | 石岿然,王成,李肯立.基于演化博弈的发电侧电力市场长期均衡模型[J].数学的实践与认识,2004,34(9):1-6. |
| 作者姓名： | 石岿然 王成 李肯立 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 南京工业大学理学院,江苏,南京,210009;南京大学管理科学与工程研究院,江苏,南京,210093 2. 南京工业大学理学院,江苏,南京,210009 3. 湖南大学计算机与通信学院,湖南,长沙,410082 |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目 (70 1 71 0 2 8) |
| 摘 要： | 研究包含生产同质电力产品的两组 (种群 )企业——低成本发电企业和高成本发电企业的发电侧电力市场的长期均衡问题 .应用演化博弈论的有限种群演化稳定战略概念 ,证明了有限种群的演化稳定战略产量分别等于两组 (种群 )企业的竞争产量 .通过建立基于企业战略模仿和试验的随机演化模型 ,分析了发电侧电力市场长期均衡的演化过程 . |
| 关 键 词： | 演化博弈 发电侧电力市场 有限种群演化稳定战略 长期均衡 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年7月12日 |
Long Run Equilibrium Model in Generation-side Electric Power Market Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory |
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| SHI Kui-ran ,WANG Cheng ,LI Keng-li.Long Run Equilibrium Model in Generation-side Electric Power Market Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2004,34(9):1-6. | |
| Authors: | SHI Kui-ran WANG Cheng LI Keng-li |
| Institution: | SHI Kui-ran 1,2,WANG Cheng 1,LI Keng-li 3 |
| Abstract: | We study a generation-side electric power market composed of two groups (or populations) of firms, the low cost firms and the high cost firms. The firms produce a homogeneous electric good. According to the concept of finite population evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), we present the result that the finite population evolutionarily stable strategy output is equal to the competitive output in each group of the firms. By establishing the stochastic evolutionary model based on imitation and experimentation of strategies by firms in each group, we also show the evolutionary process of the long run equilibrium in generation-side electric power market. |
| Keywords: | evolutionary game theory generation-side electric power market finite population evolutionarily stable strategy long run equilibrium |
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