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企业内公共物品自愿投资行为分析
引用本文:汪贤裕,王华,王勇.企业内公共物品自愿投资行为分析[J].数学的实践与认识,2006,36(10):1-7.
作者姓名:汪贤裕  王华  王勇
作者单位:1. 四川大学工商管理学院,四川,成都,610064
2. 四川大学工商管理学院,四川,成都,610064;成都信息工程学院,四川,成都,610103
摘    要:企业内公共物品的自愿投资活动是在企业“权威”授意和操作下的非盈利团队活动,也是企业文化建设的一个组成部分.本文将此活动视为企业内各经济人之间的博弈,并对此类活动的三种进行方式进行了经济人的行为分析,对模型结果进行了比较.通过比较分析表明,对规模较大,经理与工人收入差异不大的企业,采用经理与工人同时投资的效果最好;而“经理先投资,工人后投资”的活动方式,将最容易实现.

关 键 词:自愿投资  主从博弈  均衡  公共物品
修稿时间:2003年6月14日

Analysis of Voluntary Investment of Public Goods within an Enterprise
WANG Xian-yu,WANG Hua,WANG Yong.Analysis of Voluntary Investment of Public Goods within an Enterprise[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2006,36(10):1-7.
Authors:WANG Xian-yu  WANG Hua  WANG Yong
Abstract:The voluntary investment in public goods is not only the behavior of a non-profit group under the commission and operation of an enterprise′s authority,but also one of the components of an enterprise′s culture construction.In this paper,it is regarded as a game among rational individuals within an enterprise.Three kinds of such behavior have been classified and the behaviors of those rational individuals have been analyzed.It shows that for comparatively large scale enterprise,the result will be better for manager and workers to invest simultaneously.And the mode of ″manager to invest firstly,workers to follow″ will be easiest to realize.
Keywords:voluntary investment  leader-followers games  equilibrium  public goods  
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