| 制造商与两个具有竞争性的零售商的两阶段博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 冉翠玲,杨桂元,何伟.制造商与两个具有竞争性的零售商的两阶段博弈模型[J].数学的实践与认识,2010,40(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 冉翠玲 杨桂元 何伟 |
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| 作者单位： | 安徽财经大学统计与应用数学学院,安徽,蚌埠,233030 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(08JA630003); 2009年度高等学校省级优秀青年人才基金项目(2009SQRS059) |
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| 摘 要： | 针对一个制造商和两个具有竞争性的零售商组成的供应链两阶段博弈模型.首先考虑下游零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈,然后又以整体最优讨论制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈的两阶段博弈模型.数字实验结果表明:该策略不仅能提高制造商的利润,而且能改善销售商的利润,特别是对于供应链成员之间具有较高的竞争强度.
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| 关 键 词： | 两层供应链 Stackelberg博弈 定价策略 竞争强度 |
Two-stage Game Model between a Manufacturer and Two Competitive Retailers |
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| RAN Cui-ling,YANG Gui-yuan,HE Wei.Two-stage Game Model between a Manufacturer and Two Competitive Retailers[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2010,40(2). |
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| Authors: | RAN Cui-ling YANG Gui-yuan HE Wei |
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| Institution: | RAN Cui-ling,YANG Gui-yuan,HE Wei (School of Statistics , Applied Mathematics,Anhui University of Finance , Economics,Bengbu 233030,China) |
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| Abstract: | Two-stage game model is proposed for a supply chain that consists of a single manufacturer and two retailers.A Stackelberg structure is used between two retailers and manufacturer in the two-echelon supply chain.We verify numerically that:it not only makes the manufacturer's profit better but also enhances the retailer's profit especially for higher competitive intensity among numbers of the supply chain. |
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| Keywords: | two-echelon-supply chain stackelberg game pricing decision competitive intensity |
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