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非对称需求信息及零售商竞争下的供应链协调
引用本文:晓斌,刘鲁,张阿玲.非对称需求信息及零售商竞争下的供应链协调[J].数学的实践与认识,2008,38(21).
作者姓名:晓斌  刘鲁  张阿玲
摘    要:一个制造商和两个竞争的零售商组成的供应链,分析了市场信息对渠道成员及整个渠道利润的影响.渠道成员获取市场信息能增加自身的利润,以及对其他成员和整个渠道利润的变化.通过一个制造商和两个零售商之间的非完全信息博弈,研究了各成员获取信息能改变渠道利润的重新分配.基于上述分析,给出了供应链协调机制.

关 键 词:供应链管理  协调  非对称信息  博弈论

Supply Chain Coordination under Asymmetric Demand Information When Retailers Compete
XIAO Bin,LIU Lu,ZHANG A-ling.Supply Chain Coordination under Asymmetric Demand Information When Retailers Compete[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2008,38(21).
Authors:XIAO Bin  LIU Lu  ZHANG A-ling
Abstract:We explore the pricing and profit implications of demand information within a channel setting.The model a distribution channel consists of a single manufacturer selling its product through two competing retailers.The demand information among the members is asymmetric.We find that improved information about demand always results in greater absolute profits,as well as a claim on greater division of channel profits for the informed channel member.
Keywords:supply chain management  coordination  asymmetric information  game theory
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