| 基金投资中委托代理问题的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 胡子康,朱涛,王永县.基金投资中委托代理问题的博弈分析[J].数学的实践与认识,2007,37(21):25-32. |
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| 作者姓名： | 胡子康 朱涛 王永县 |
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| 作者单位： | 清华大学,经济管理学院,北京,100084 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于基金市场中的信息不对称,以及基金管理者和投资者之间的利益不一致,使得逆向选择和道德风险这两类委托代理问题成为基金治理时的核心问题之一,关于它们的研究对于保护投资者权益,发展和完善基金市场都有重要意义.从博弈分析的角度出发,通过建立不同的动态博弈模型,研究了这两类委托代理问题在基金市场上存在的原因以及可能产生的主要影响,并在参数分析的基础上提出了一些解决问题的想法和建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 基金投资 逆向选择 道德风险 博弈论 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年6月16日 |
The Game Theory Analysis on Principal-agent Problems of Fund Investment |
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| HU Zi-kang,ZHU Tao,WANG Yong-xian.The Game Theory Analysis on Principal-agent Problems of Fund Investment[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2007,37(21):25-32. |
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| Authors: | HU Zi-kang ZHU Tao WANG Yong-xian |
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| Abstract: | Because of information asymmetry and different interest existing in fund market,adverse selection and moral hazard become the primary problems in principal-agent relationship of fund investment,so research works on them have important significance to protect investor rights and to develop the efficiency of fund market.In this paper,we set up several concise dynamic game models to analyze the existing foundation and probable influence of the two agent problems in fund market,in addition,we propose some suggestions to solve the problems based on parameter analysis of the models. |
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| Keywords: | fund Investment adverse selection moral hazard game theory |
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