| 激励上游企业创新投入的供应链协调研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 田巍,张子刚,刘开军.激励上游企业创新投入的供应链协调研究[J].数学的实践与认识,2010,40(9). |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 田巍 张子刚 刘开军 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 广西财经学院工商管理系;华中科技大学管理学院; |
| |
| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究基金，广西自然科学基金，广西教育厅科研项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 建立了基于上游企业创新投入降低运作成本的供应链博弈模型,研究发现上游企业创新投入与市场性质、上下游企业在供应链中的地位、上游企业的保留利润都有关,比较了不同市场性质下供应链整体利润之间的关系,提出了基于不同决策者下使上游企业的创新投入达到供应链最优的协调契约,最后通过具体算例分析证实了结论.
|
| 关 键 词： | 博弈模型 创新投入 供应链契约 供应链协调 |
A Supply Chain Coordination Study of Stimulating Upstream Innovation Investment |
| |
| TIAN Wei,ZHANG Zi-gang,LIU Kai-jun.A Supply Chain Coordination Study of Stimulating Upstream Innovation Investment[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2010,40(9). |
| |
| Authors: | TIAN Wei ZHANG Zi-gang LIU Kai-jun |
| |
| Institution: | TIAN Wei~1,ZHANG Zi-gang~2,LIU Kai-jun~2 (1.Department of Business & Administration,Guangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanning 530003,China) (2.School of Management,Huazhong University of Science & Technology,Wuhan 430074,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | A supply chain game model about upstream innovation investment to decrease operating costs is constructed.The research indicates that market character,leadship of supply chain and reserve profits of upstream enterprise all have great influence on upstream innovation input.The comparison of profit of supply chain among different market character is made.The optimal investment input which coordinates the whole supply chain by supply chain contracts made by different deciders is proposed.In the end,a numerical... |
| |
| Keywords: | game model innovation input supply chain contract supply chain coordination |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
