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基于顾客满意的渠道合作机制研究
引用本文:丁川,王开弘.基于顾客满意的渠道合作机制研究[J].数学的实践与认识,2008,38(11):36-43.
作者姓名:丁川  王开弘
作者单位:1. 西南财经大学,经济数学学院,四川,成都,610074;西南财经大学,工商管理学院,四川,成都,610074
2. 西南财经大学,经济数学学院,四川,成都,610074
基金项目:西南财经大学校科研和教改项目
摘    要:将零售商的服务分为短期性服务和基于顾客满意的长期性服务,由于长期性服务对销售量的影响具有滞后性,因此本文建立了多时期渠道动态决策模型.在此基础上分析了三种情况:①制造商对零售商的长期性服务不激励、②制造商对零售商的长期性服务激励和③渠道整合结果表明:如果制造商不对零售商激励,零售商也有长期性服务偏好;如果对零售商激励,那么零售商付出的长期性服务更多,他们的努力程度由零售商利润的贴现系数决定.同时渠道整合时,渠道总利润要优于其余两种情况.制造商对零售商激励时双方的利润都要大于不激励时的利润,渠道整合时双方的利润与他们的分配比例有关.

关 键 词:分销渠道  合作  顾客满意  激励
修稿时间:2008年2月11日

A Study On Coordination Mechanisms of Channel for Being Based On Customer Satisfaction
DING Chuan,WANG Kai-hong.A Study On Coordination Mechanisms of Channel for Being Based On Customer Satisfaction[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2008,38(11):36-43.
Authors:DING Chuan  WANG Kai-hong
Abstract:The retailer′s service was composed of short-term service and long-term service for being based on customer satisfaction.so in the paper channel dynamic decision model was constituted because long-term service affect market with delay,on the base of it,three cases was analyzed: manufacturers didn′t incentive retailer for long-term service、manufacturer motivated retailer for long-term service and channel integration.The results show the retailer favors long-term service if manufacturers didn′t incentive retailer;the retailer pay more long-term service if manufacturers motivated retailer;Their effort was made by the retailer′s a discounts factor to future profits.at same time,channel total profits is more than the two others in the channel integration.if manufacturers motivated retailer,manufacturer and retailer′s profits is more than no incentive,in the channel integration,both profits is related with their assigning proportionment.
Keywords:distribution channel  coordination  customer satisfaction  incentive
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