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军事威慑博弈中挑战者行为预测模型比较
引用本文:向钢华,王永县.军事威慑博弈中挑战者行为预测模型比较[J].数学的实践与认识,2008,38(20).
作者姓名:向钢华  王永县
摘    要:将基于完全理性的期望效用理论与基于有限理性的前景理论的两种决策模型应用于军事威慑两阶段博弈分析之中.研究结果表明,前景理论模型与期望效用理论模型对挑战者行为的预测结果具有显著的差异.

关 键 词:军事威慑  博弈  效用  权重函数

Models Comparison for Predicting Challenger's Behaviors in Military Deterrence Game
XIANG Gang-hua,WANG Yong-xian.Models Comparison for Predicting Challenger''s Behaviors in Military Deterrence Game[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2008,38(20).
Authors:XIANG Gang-hua  WANG Yong-xian
Abstract:Both prospect thoery based on complete rationality and expected utility theory based on limited rationality are applied in the analysis of two-stage game of military deterrence.The study results show that there are significant differences between prospect theory model and expected utility theory model for predicting the challenger′s behaviors.
Keywords:military deterrence  game  utility  weighting function
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