| 工程招投标中的激励机制分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张明媚,刘开第.工程招投标中的激励机制分析[J].数学的实践与认识,2002,32(3):387-391. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张明媚 刘开第 |
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| 作者单位： | 河北建筑科技学院,河北,056038 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文试图利用博弈理论 ,对工程招投标过程中存在的现象进行分析 ,并建立了相应的对策模型 .目的是通过所建模型讨论工程招投标过程中招投标双方的对策及博弈 ,力图达到一种均衡
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| 关 键 词： | 招投标 模型 不完全信息博弈 保留效用 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001年9月14日 |
Analysis of the Incentive Mechanism of Project Bid Invitation and bidding |
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| ZHANG Ming\|mei,\ LIU Kai\|di.Analysis of the Incentive Mechanism of Project Bid Invitation and bidding[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2002,32(3):387-391. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Ming\|mei \ LIU Kai\|di |
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| Abstract: | The paper attempts to use game theory to analyze the phenomena which exist in the course of bid invitation and bidding and to set up the relative countermeasure model. In order to discuss the countermeasure and game of both sides during the project bid invitation and bidding and to get to a balance. |
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| Keywords: | bid invitation and bidding incomplete information game theory retention usefulness |
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