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基于博弈的网络团购供应链信任协调机制研究
引用本文:罗晓娜,史彦虎,朱先奇.基于博弈的网络团购供应链信任协调机制研究[J].数学的实践与认识,2014(22).
作者姓名:罗晓娜  史彦虎  朱先奇
作者单位:太原理工大学经济管理学院;
摘    要:随着网络团购的快速发展,失信问题日益突出,此问题若得不到解决,将严重制约网络团购的发展规模.分析了影响供应链成员间信任的因素,并在运用KMRW声誉模型进行有限次重复博弈的基础上,引入第三方信用监管机构,设计了相应的约束机制和激励机制.分析结果显示,声誉模型对交易双方信任合作提供隐性激励,建立长期战略合作关系,有利于机会主义的守约行为;第三方信用监管机构的介入可以约束交易双方的机会主义行为,减少他们之间的信息不对称,能够最大限度的减少网络团购交易中的风险.

关 键 词:网络团购供应链  信任协调  KMRW声誉模型  第三方信用监管

Research on the Trust Coordination Mechanism in Supply Chain of Network Group Purchase Based on Game
Abstract:With the rapid development of network group purchase,credibility problem increasingly prominent.If this problem is not solved,it will seriously restrict the development of the network group purchase.The article analyzes the influence factors of trust between supply chain members,and based on the infinitely repeated game:KMRW reputation model,introduced the third party credit supervision,designed the corresponding restrained mechanism and incentive mechanism.The analysis results show that the reputation model create implicit incentives for the trust cooperation between trading partners.Establishing a long-term strategic cooperative relationship is beneficial to controlling the opportunistic behaviors;The third party credit supervision' intervention can constraint the opportunistic behavior of both parties,reduce the information asymmetry between them and to minimize the risk of the network deals.
Keywords:network group purchase supply chain  trust coordinate  KMRW reputation model  the third party credit supervision
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