非对称信息下供应链批发价格契约应对突发事件

针对两个制造商与一个零售商组成的二级供应链,建立了制造商一方与零售商联盟,制造商另一方与之竞争、零售商类型为其私人信息下的博弈模型,从系统优化的角度研究了供应链系统批发价格如何应对突发事件.首先证明稳定条件下,零售商成本信息为非对称信息时,批发价格契约能实现集中控制与分散控制下-该供应链的协调.当突发事件造成零售商的成本分布变化时,通过求解突发事件下供应链系统最优利润的Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)条件,提出了供应链应对突发事件的最优策略,进一步证明了改进的批发价格契约可以协调突发事件下分散化决策的供应链系统.数值仿真表明,当零售商的成本在一个较小的范围内扰动时,原有契约机制具有一定的鲁棒性,而当扰动较大时,需要对原来的生产计划进行调整.

Supply Chain Wholesale Price Contract Under Asymmetric Information and Disruption

The wholesale price contract models are investigated in a two-level supply chain with two suppliers and one retailer under asymmetric information when the retailer's costs are disrupted.First,supply chain contract models for basic contract in centralized control and wholesale price contract in decentrahzed control cases are proposed in a regular scenario under the information of retailer's cost structure asymmetric information.Then,when retailer's cost distribution is fluctuated by disruptions,the optimal react strategies of supply chain are studied by solving Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT) conditions of the chain system under disruptions.Furthermore,we prove that the improved wholesale price contract can coordinate the decentralized control supply chain system under disruptions.The simulation results show that it is optimal for the suppliers to keep original production plan if variation of retailer's cost is fairly small which shows that the original contract models have certain robustness.Decisions must be adjusted if retailer's cost change is larger.