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考虑政府补贴和公平偏好的可追溯食品供应链决策研究
引用本文:林强,秦智聃,傅志妍.考虑政府补贴和公平偏好的可追溯食品供应链决策研究[J].数学的实践与认识,2022(1):28-43.
作者姓名:林强  秦智聃  傅志妍
作者单位:;1.重庆第二师范学院婴幼产品与服务供应链研究中心
基金项目:重庆市社会科学规划培育项目(2019PY46);国家自然科学基金项目(71802031)。
摘    要:考虑消费者溯源偏好与食品供应链可追溯水平对市场需求的影响,构建由一个食品生产企业和一个食品零售企业组成的可追溯食品供应链博弈模型,研究政府补贴、可追溯努力成本分担和公平偏好对可追溯食品供应链决策及利润的影响.结果表明:政府补贴与可追溯努力成本分担均能促进食品生产企业提高可追溯努力水平,进而提升食品供应链可追溯水平.政府补贴行为对食品生产企业和食品零售企业均有利,而食品零售企业成本分担行为只有在分担比例较小时才对自身和可追溯食品供应链整体有利.在公平偏好信息对称时,食品零售企业的公平偏好能够增加自身最优利润,但会削弱食品生产企业的可追溯努力水平、批发价格和最优利润以及可追溯食品供应链整体最优利润;在公平偏好信息不对称时,食品零售企业的公平偏好不影响食品生产企业决策,但会促使自身零售价格的增加,从而降低市场需求并削弱所有供应链成员的利润.

关 键 词:食品供应链  可追溯  政府补贴  公平偏好  决策

The Decision-making of Traceability Food Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Fairness Preference
LIN Qiang,QIN Zhi-dan,FU Zhi-yan.The Decision-making of Traceability Food Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Fairness Preference[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2022(1):28-43.
Authors:LIN Qiang  QIN Zhi-dan  FU Zhi-yan
Institution:(Research Center for Infant Products and Services Supply Chain,Chongqing University of Education,Chongqing 400067,China)
Abstract:Considering the effect of consumer ’s traceability preference and traceability level of food supply chain on the market demand,the game model of traceability food supply chain is constructed,which consists of a food producer and a food retailer.The effects of government subsidy,cost sharing behavior and fairness preference characteristic on traceability food supply chain strategies and profits were studied.The results show that both the government subsidy and cost sharing behavior of food retailer can promote the food producer to increase the traceability effort level,so as to improve the traceability level of food supply chain.The government subsidy is beneficial to both food producer and food retailer,while the cost-sharing behavior of food retailer is beneficial to itself and food supply chain when the cost-sharing ratio is relatively small.In the case of fairness preference information symmetry,the fairness preference of food retailer will increase its own profit,but will weaken the traceability effort level,wholesale price and optimal profit of food producer and the whole profit of traceability food supply chain.In the case of fairness preference information asymmetry,the fairness preference of food retailer does not affect the decision of food producer,but will increase his own retail price,thus reducing the market demand and weakening the profits of all members of the traceability food supply chain.
Keywords:food supply chain  traceability  government subsidy  fairness preference  decision-making
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