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安全生产下政府、煤矿企业、员工的决策行为演化研究
引用本文:腾云,刘磊,陈新琳,余志刚.安全生产下政府、煤矿企业、员工的决策行为演化研究[J].运筹与管理,2022,31(1):61-67.
作者姓名:腾云  刘磊  陈新琳  余志刚
作者单位:1.东北农业大学 工程学院,黑龙江 哈尔滨 150030; 2.吉林大学 机械与航空航天工程学院,吉林 长春 130022; 3.东北农业大学 经济管理学院,黑龙江 哈尔滨 150030
基金项目:国家社科基金重点项目(18AJY016);教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(18YJC630162,18YJA790100);黑龙江省博士后资金项目(LBH-Z17018);北方寒地现代化农业装备技术重点实验室项目(KF18-01);东北农业大学“学术骨干”项目(54936412);黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划年度项目(21JYD273)。
摘    要:安全生产对于煤矿企业至关重要,本研究将政府、煤矿企业和员工纳入演化博弈模型中,探究三方主体间决策的博弈关系和演化路径。研究表明:政府、煤矿企业和员工的决策向理想状态的演化过程受到诸多因素的影响,不同因素取值范围对三方主体向理想状态收敛速度产生差异化影响;当满足一定条件时,三方主体的决策行为能够演化为理想状态,政府有效监管能够促进企业由惩罚型向激励型模式转化,激励型模式能够有效激发员工安全主动行为。以期为政府制定安全监管决策、企业转化安全生产管理模式、员工激发安全主动行为提供有益的建议。

关 键 词:安全生产  管理模式  安全行为  博弈演化  
收稿时间:2015-06-15

Research on Decision-making Behavior Evolutionary among Governments、Coal Mining Enterprises and Workers under the Background of Safety Production
TENG Yun,LIU lei,CHEN Xin-lin,YU Zhi-gang.Research on Decision-making Behavior Evolutionary among Governments、Coal Mining Enterprises and Workers under the Background of Safety Production[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2022,31(1):61-67.
Authors:TENG Yun  LIU lei  CHEN Xin-lin  YU Zhi-gang
Institution:1. Engineering School, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin 150030, China; 2. Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering School, Jilin University, Changchun 130022, China; 3. Economics and management School, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin 150030, China
Abstract:Safety production is very important to coal mining enterprises.The research incorporates the government,coal mining enterprises and employees into the evolutionary game model,to explore the game relationship and evolution path of decision-making among the three stakeholders in safety production.The research shows:The evolution of the decision-making behavior of the government,coal mining enterprises and employees to an ideal state is affected by many factors,and the value range of different factors has a differentiated influence on the convergence speed of the three stakeholders to the ideal state;When certain conditions are met,the decision-making behavior of the three stakeholders can evolve into an ideal state,and effective government supervision can promote the transformation of enterprises from punishment to incentive safety management mode,and the incentive safety management model can effectively motivate employees’safety initiative behaviors.It is expected to provide useful suggestions for the government to make safety supervision decisions,enterprises to transform safety production management models,and employees to stimulate safe and proactive behavior.
Keywords:safety production  management model  safety active behavior  evolutionary game
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