供应链金融信贷市场三方演化博弈动态

供应链金融业务的产生与发展为中小微企业的融资提供了有效的途径。核心企业在为中小微企业提供信用担保的同时,也对中小微企业的生产等经济活动进行监督,以维持供应链上各企业的信用及效益。本文考虑供应链金融各参与方之间的相互影响,构建“金融机构——核心企业——中小微企业”三方博弈主体的演化博弈动态模型。运用演化博弈理论与Lyapunov判别法分析三方演化动态模型的均衡点以及其渐进稳定性。结论表明:中小微企业得到的预期利益越大、违约的成本越大,就越不容易选择违约,供应链金融信贷系统将演化到核心企业为中小微企业提供贷款信用担保,金融机构对中小微企业进行贷款、中小微企业选择不违约的演化均衡状态,信贷市场呈良性发展的趋势。

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Credit Market of Supply Chain Finance

The emergence and development of supply chain finance provide an effective way for the financing of medium and micro enterprises.Core enterprises,while providing credit guarantee for medium and micro enterprises,also supervise the production and other economic activities of medium and micro enterprises,so as to maintain the credit and benefits of all enterprises in the supply chain.This paper considers the interaction between the participants of supply chain finance,and constructs an evolutionary game dynamic model of the tripartite game subject of“financial institutions-core enterprises-medium and micro enterprises”.Evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov stability discriminant method are used to analyze the equilibrium point and asymptotic stability of the dynamic model of evolutionary game.The conclusions show that the higher the expected returnthe medium and micro enterprises obtain and the greater the cost of default is,the less easy it is to breach contract.The supply chain in the financial system will evolve to the stage where financial institutions provide loans for medium and micro enterprises,for which the core enterprise guarantees,and medium and micro enterprises choose not to default,thus credit markets being in good shape.