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信息不对称下混合渠道零售商创新投入的供应链影响研究
引用本文:田巍,蒋侃,王东红.信息不对称下混合渠道零售商创新投入的供应链影响研究[J].运筹与管理,2014,23(2):82-88.
作者姓名:田巍  蒋侃  王东红
作者单位:1.广西财经学院 工商管理学院,广西 南宁 530003; 2.广西大学 计算机与电子信息学院,广西 南宁 530004; 3.广西财经学院 管理科学与工程学院,广西 南宁 530003
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71362012);广西高校科学技术研究项目(2013YB211);广西社科规划项目(13FGL002);广西高校优秀人才资助计划项目
摘    要:通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了在混合渠道下零售商创新投入对供应链的影响,分析了零售商创新成本系数信息对称和不对称两种情况下各方的决策变量和利润受创新成本系数,制造商对零售商创新信息掌握的不确定性程度,需求转移系数,市场潜力及创新潜力等的影响关系。研究结果发现制造商总能通过信息分享受益,另外得到了零售商愿意分享成本信息以及使得供应链整体受益的条件,这些为制造商信息分享决策提供了依据。最后通过算例分析对结果进行了验证。

关 键 词:供应链  创新投入  信息不对称  Stackelberg博弈  混合渠道  
收稿时间:2012-01-05

Supply Chain Effects of Retailer's Innovation Investment for Mixed Channels Under Information Asymmetry
TIAN Wei,JIANG Kan,WANG Dong-hong.Supply Chain Effects of Retailer's Innovation Investment for Mixed Channels Under Information Asymmetry[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2014,23(2):82-88.
Authors:TIAN Wei  JIANG Kan  WANG Dong-hong
Institution:1. School of Business Administration, Guangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanning 530003, China; 2. School of Computer,Electronics & Information, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China; 3. School of Management Science & Engineering, Guangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanning 530003, China
Abstract:In this paper, using a Stackelberg game model, we study supply chain effects of retailer's innovation investment for mixed channels. We obtain the partners' closed form solutions of decisive variables and profits under both complete and incomplete information about the retailer's cost parameter of innovation investment, and analyze how this cost parameter, uncertainty degree of the manufacturer about the retailer's cost structure, customers migration rate, base demand of market, innovation potential influence them. We find that the manufacturer would always benefit by obtaining more cost information, and the conditions under which the retailer would be willing to share information with the manufacturer and whole supply chain would improve. All these would help the manufacturer to decide about an information sharing contract with the retailer. Finally, the numerical examples are provided to verify the conclusions.
Keywords:supply chain  innovation investment  information asymmetry  stackelberg game  mixed channels1  
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