基于环境审计的节能减排规制模型

为考察环境审计在节能减排中的规制效果,本文设计了两个参与人三种情境下的博弈模型,(1)监管者介入公司环境审计报告、无条件处罚,(2)监管者不介入公司环境审计报告、无条件处罚,(3)监管者介入公司环境审计报告,有条件处罚。研究结果表明,审计报告的介入权为公司开展环境审计提供了正向激励;公司因努力改善环境而减轻处罚的有条件处罚机制增加了公司环境审计的倾向性。本文的研究发现为环境审计制度设计提供了理论基础。

Environmental Audit-Based Model on the Regulation of the Energy Saving andEmission Reduction

In order to inspect the environmental audit’s regulation effect on the energy saving and emission reduction, the paper designs the two-person game models under three situations: (1)the supervisor gets involved in the company’s environmental audit report, unconditional punishment. (2)the supervisor doesn’t get involved in the company’s environmental audit report, unconditional punishment. (3)the supervisor gets involved in the company’s environmental audit report, conditional punishment. The study results show that the intervention right of the audit report provides the company with positive incentive to carry out the environmental audit. The conditional punishment mechanism, that is, the company’s efforts to improve the environment can reduce the punishment and increase the tendentiousness of the company’s environmental audit. The findings of the paper provide the environmental audit system with the theoretical foundation.