考虑闲置产能分享参与者利益的平台定价研究

信息技术的快速发展,使得闲置产能的分享逐渐成为生产领域重要的产能利用模式。为研究闲置产能分享时平台的最优定价问题,在平台向供给者收取交易费而对需求者不收费的条件下,首先,建立商业平台和公益平台的基础模型,并对两类平台进行分析和对比;然后,在基础模型之上构建以一定权重考虑其他参与者利益的平台X的定价模型,探讨权重对最优交易费、供需双方的数量以及平台最优利润的影响;最后,用数值例子验证文中重要定理以及权重对供需双方效用产生的影响。研究结果表明:(1)商业平台收取的最优交易费和获得的最优利润均高于公益平台;(2)考虑其他参与者利益的平台X收取的最优交易费和获得的最优利润、需求者(免费方)的数量和效用均随着权重的增加而增加,而供给者(被收费方)的数量及其效用则随着权重的增加而减少。研究结果为平台运营商和企业的行为决策提供理论参考依据。

Research on Platform Pricing Considering the Benefits of Idle Capacity Sharing Participants

With the rapid development of information technology, the sharing of idle capacity has graduallybecome an important capacity utilization mode in the production field. In order to study the optimal pricing of platform when idle capacity is shared, under the condition that the platform collects transaction fees from suppliers and does not charge the demanders, the basic models of commercial platform and public welfare platform are established and compared. The pricing model of platform X with certain weight considering the benefits of other participants is built on the basis of the basic model to discuss the influence of weight on the optimal transaction cost, the quantity of both the supplier and the supplier and the optimal profit of the platform. Finally, the important theorems and the influence of weight on the utility of both parties are verified by the numerical example. The results show that: (1)the optimal transaction fee and the optimal profit obtained by commercial platform are higher than that of public welfare platform; (2)the optimal transaction fee and optimal profit obtained by the platform X considering the benefits of other participants, the quantity and utility of demander increase with the increase of weight, while the quantity and utility of the supplier decrease with the weight. This paper provides theoretical reference for the behavior decision of platform operators and enterprises.