收购价不确定下订单农业供应链融资方式选择——外部融资VS内部融资

基于“保底收购,随行就市”的订单价格机制,构建了“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链模型,求解了外部融资均衡和内部融资均衡,分析了收购公司和农户对外部融资方式和内部融资方式的选择意愿以及订单农业供应链的融资方式选择结果。研究发现,公司总是希望农户选择期望回报率低的融资方式,然而自有资金高的农户却偏爱期望回报率高的融资方式,这是因为期望回报率高时农户会降低投产量,而公司为激励农户会提高保底价,此时对农户而言保底价增大带来的收益要大于期望回报率增加带来的损失,但供应链整体利益却受到损害。最重要的是,公司出台内部融资的补贴和额外收费政策可以实现供应链双方的共赢。

Channels Selection of Financing for Contract-farming Supply Chain under Uncertain Acquiring Price: External Financing VS Internal Financing

As the government attaches importance to the issue of agricultural production and food acquisition, the state adopts the policy of the minimum purchase price of grain. Based on the protection price contract, we analyze the equilibrium of financing for the order agricultural supply chain constrained by funds. If the company is willing to lend the agricultural materials to the farmer, the farmer will make a choice between borrowing money from the bank and borrowing materials from the company. In this paper, the focus is on: Under what circumstances will the company be willing to provide financing services to the farmer? How does the farmer’s own capital level affect the choice of the company and the farmer, and the selection result of the supply chain? What steps are being taken to improve the supply chain? Based on the protection price contract, a model for “company+farmer” contract-farming supply chain is constructed. We solve the equilibrium of the external financing and the internal financing, then analyze the intentions of choice between the external financing method and the internal financing method for the acquiring company and the farmer, and the final selection for the whole contract-farming supply chain. The study finds that the company always wants the farmer to choose the financing option with lower expected rate of return, however, the farmer who has many of his own capital prefers the option with higher expected rate of return, this is because when the expected rate of return is high, the farmer will reduce production, while the company will raise the base price to encourage the farmer. At this time, for the farmer, the gain from an increase in base price is greater than the loss from an increase in expected rate of return. However the benefit of the whole supply chain will be damaged. It is vital that the win-win situation between the two sides of the supply chain can be achieved by subsidy policy and extra charge policy introduced by the company when the internal financing service is provided. In a word, our conclusions provide enlightenment for the farmer to choose financing method and for the company to decide that whether to provide financing services for the farmer. The purpose of this paper is to provide enlightenment for the healthy development of future contract-farming trade, and solve the blindness of production for farmers.