基于收益共享机制的干支线衔接运输联合定价模型

在班轮运输网络中,支线运输与干线运输具有互补性,干线承运人与支线承运人之间的合作能够为托运人提供更高的便利度和更完善的运输服务。本文在考虑可替代运输路径之间竞争关系的基础上,研究干支线衔接路径的定价问题,在运输链纵向一体化和分散化两种结构下,构建Bertrand博弈模型研究上下游承运人的均衡运价。同时,设计合理的收益共享机制,使承运人在分散结构的运输系统中仍能实现运输链的协调。

Model of Connecting Service Pricing under Revenue Sharing Strategies

There exists a strong complementary relationship between mainline and feeder line in liner shipping network. Shippers would obtain better connecting service with more convenience, which is improved by vertical cooperation between mainline carrier and feeder carrier. In this paper, the pricing issue of shipping service, which connects mainline with feeder line, has been studied in consideration of competition among parallel substitute itineraries. A Bertrand model is developed to analyze the equilibrium state of shipping market under two types of transport chain, namely centralized and decentralized structures. The superiority of the centralized transport chain has been proven. And then, the deduced equilibrium result could provide carriers upstream and downstream with decision support. Moreover, a reasonable revenue sharing mechanism is designed for decentralized transport chain. The results show that the possibility of pareto improvement exists in the decentralized structure of transport chain, and the coordination of transport chain could be achieved through the revenue sharing mechanism.