不确定需求下的网络代销平台返利优化决策

在电商与信息化时代, 网络代销平台在产品促销方面的优势越来越明显。与折扣促销不同, 返利促销需要消费者先全款购买, 再事后兑现。本文构建了一个制造商和一个网络代销平台组成的销售系统, 考虑产品需求为可加式随机且同时受价格和返利促销影响, 在Stackelberg博弈框架下研究了制造商的定价与库存策略以及网络代销平台的返利优化决策。研究发现, 当消费者对返利的敏感程度逐渐增强时, 网络代销平台会更倾向于向消费者提供更多的返利, 此时代销平台与制造商实现共赢; 而当消费者的返利兑现率逐渐增大时, 返利平台会降低返利促销的强度, 此时会导致制造商的利益受损。

Optimization of Rebate Decision for an Internet Agency under Demand Uncertainty

In the era of e-commerce and informatization,the advantage of promotion by internet agency is becoming increasingly significant for firms.Rebate promotion needs consumers to buy the products with full price and redeem the refund later,which is different from the discount promotion.We model a sales system comprising a manufacturer and an internet agency,in which the demand is stochastic and depends on price and rebate promotion,then examine the pricing and stocking strategies of the manufacturer and the rebate decision of the agency under Stackelberg game theory.Our results show that,the agency would like to offer more rebates to consumers when consumers are more sensitive to the rebate promotion.As a result,there is a win-win situation for both the manufacturer and agency.However,as the rebate redemption increases,the agency will shrink the rebate value in his best interest,while it hurts the manufacturer’s profit.