全生命周期视阈下责任式创新的演化博弈及扩散机制研究

构建政府、企业和公众三方演化博弈模型,并引入Lotka-Volterra模型来探究利益相关者在责任式创新全生命周期中的行为策略演化和相互作用机制,以及不同响应手段对责任式创新扩散的影响。研究结果表明:在责任式创新全生命周期的新生阶段、成长阶段和成熟内化阶段中,政府分别扮演着“倡导人”、“推广人”和“守夜人”的角色,且其在新生阶段对责任式创新的倡导推广直接影响了其后续的扩散状态;在成长阶段和成熟内化阶段中,高额惩罚、低治理成本和公众参与能正向促进企业责任式创新,而适当的激励补贴会避免企业产生“骗补”行为;政府和公众的适当响应手段共同促进责任式创新由共生向全扩散状态演化,而政府的过度倡导推广会导致扩散效率下降。

Research on Evolutionary Game and Diffusion Mechanism of Responsible Innovation from the Perspective of Life Cycle

The negative externality of innovation has caused all circles to pay close attention to the implementation and diffusion of responsible innovation, and it is urgent to further clarify the mechanism of its development and diffusion in the whole life cycle in order to achieve a more comprehensive and full realization of the coordinated development of technology and society. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, enterprise and the public, and introduces the Lotka-Volterra model to explore the behavior strategies evolution and interaction mechanism of stakeholder in the life cycle of responsible innovation, as well as the influence of their different responsiveness means on the diffusion of responsible innovation. The research results show that in the initial, growth and mature internalization phases of the life cycle of responsible innovation, the government plays the role of “advocator”, “promoter” and “night watchman” respectively, and the initial promotion of responsible innovation affects its subsequent diffusion status. In the growth and mature internalization phases, high penalty, low governance cost and public participation have the frontage influence on responsible innovation of enterprise,while reasonable incentives will prevent enterprise from generating “deceptive subsidy”. The appropriate responsiveness measures of the government and public jointly promote responsible innovation from symbiosis to full diffusion, while the excessive promotion of government will lead to a decline in diffusion efficiency.