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考虑公众参与的公共工程项目应急管理演化分析
引用本文:杨苏,林浩东.考虑公众参与的公共工程项目应急管理演化分析[J].运筹与管理,2021,30(5):95-101.
作者姓名:杨苏  林浩东
作者单位:1.安徽建筑大学 经济与管理学院,安徽 合肥 230601;2.安徽省建筑经济与房地产管理中心,安徽 合肥 230601
基金项目:安徽省教育厅人文社科重点项目(SK2020A0258)
摘    要:在当前的公共工程项目突发事件应急管理过程中,公众参与正起着越来越重要的作用。文章基于有限理性假设,考虑公众参与在公共工程项目应急管理中的影响作用,将政府角色细分为中央政府和地方政府两个决策主体,构建了中央政府—地方政府—公众三方的非合作演化博弈模型,分析了不同决策主体的演化稳定策略,模拟了决策过程,并通过仿真验证了模型结论。研究结果显示:公众参与已成为公共工程应急管理决策进程中的重要力量,若三方中的中央政府能够有效的规制地方政府的不规范行为,公众参与能起到较好的“旁站”监督效果,将会促进系统趋向“中央政府有效监督,地方政府有效规制,公众积极参与”的理想演化稳定均衡状态。

关 键 词:公众参与  公共工程项目  应急管理  演化博弈  仿真分析  
收稿时间:2020-04-10

Analysis of the Evolution of Emergency Management of Public Engineering Projects Considering Public Participation
YANG Su,LIN Hao-dong.Analysis of the Evolution of Emergency Management of Public Engineering Projects Considering Public Participation[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2021,30(5):95-101.
Authors:YANG Su  LIN Hao-dong
Institution:1. School of Economicsand Management, Anhui Jianzhu University, Hefei 230601, China;2. Anhui Construction Economy and Real Estate Management Center, Hefei 230601, China
Abstract:In the current emergency management of public engineering projects, public participation plays an increasingly important role. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, the article considers the impact of public participation in the emergency management of public construction projects, subdivides the role of the government into two decision-making bodies, central government and local government, and establishes a non-cooperative evolution of the central government-local government-public tripartite The game model analyzes the evolutionary and stable strategies of different decision-making entities, simulates the decision-making process, and verifies the conclusions of the model through simulation. The research results show that public participation has become an important force in the decision-making process of public engineering emergency management. If the central government of the three parties effectively regulates the irregular behavior of local governments, public participation will have a better “side-by-side” supervision effect, so as to promote the ideal evolution of the system toward a stable equilibrium state of “effective supervision by the central government, effective regulation by local governments, and active public participation”.
Keywords:public participation  public engineering projects  emergency management  evolutionary game  simulation analysis  
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