基于减排成本共担期权契约的供应链协调

考虑消费者具有低碳产品偏好的情况,研究需求随机且受减排影响的期权契约,建立了由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链模型。该模型中制造商处主导地位,零售商处追随地位,制造商首先提出期权契约,零售商购买期权。求解发现,由于传统双重边际化效应的存在,只有当零售价格等于期权执行价格时,才能达到供应链的协调,这时零售商利润为负,不满足参与约束。为此,从降低期权执行价格的角度,对期权契约进行补充,增加了成本共担条款。研究表明,减排成本共担的期权契约能够实现供应链的协调。最后利用算例验证了结论,计算了制造商和零售商利润及零售商分担的减排成本比例随期权价格和期权执行价格的变化情况,并对减排难度系数的敏感性做了分析。

Supply Chain Coordination Based on Options Contract with Jointed Carbon Emission Reduction Cost Sharing

Based on the fact that consumers usually have low carbon product preferences, this paper studies options contract with the random demand affected by emission reduction and establishes a supply chain model consisting of one single manufacturer and one single retailer. In this model, the manufacturer is the leader who proposes options contract, and the retailer is the follower who purchases the options contract. We find that due to the existence of double marginalization effect, the supply chain could achieve the coordination only when the retail price is equal to the option exercise price. But, in this case, the retailer's profit is negative, and it cannot meet the participation constraint. Therefore, to reduce the option exercise price, we add options contract as a supplement and increase cost sharing contract. It is shown that option contract with jointed carbon emission reduction cost sharing can coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we verify the conclusions by the results of example, compute the profits of both the manufacture and retailer, the changes of the retailer`s profit and cost sharing ratio affected by changes of the option price and the option exercise price, and analyze the sensitivity of carbon emission difficulty factor.