基于演化博弈的制造企业服务创新扩散研究

制造企业服务化是我国实现制造强国的必经之路,本文以“中国制造2025”战略为背景,通过借鉴创新扩散和演化博弈理论,对社会系统中参与服务创新的相关主体进行分析,构建政府与企业之间演化博弈模型,结合并改进Bass经典创新扩散模型,探究政府规制行为对企业服务创新行为演化及扩散的影响,利用Matlab对复制动态方程和扩散模型进行数学推导和数值仿真分析。结果表明:当满足政府的社会总收益大于其调控成本和各项补贴总额且企业选择服务创新策略时收益的额外增加额大于其实际投入时,系统才会演化至政府调控且企业采纳服务创新的稳定状态;适当增加政府对企业的调控力度、投入补贴和税收补贴有助于推进服务创新在系统中的扩散,其中税收补贴的感知能力最强,投入补贴最弱;将抑制系数引入Bass创新扩散模型,构建互补型、竞争型和替代型三种服务创新的扩散模式,其中竞争型扩散符合中国现阶段市场规律,替代性扩散将成为未来制造企业的发展趋势。

Research on the Service Innovation Diffusion of Manufacturing Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

The paper is based on the background of “Made in China 2025” strategy. Following the innovation diffusion and evolutionary game theory, related to the participation of service innovation in the social system analysis, it constructs a evolutionary game model for the government and enterprises, which is combined with the improved Bass classic innovation diffusion model, explores the impact of government regulation on enterprise service innovation behavior evolution and diffusion, uses Matlab to analyse the dynamic functions and the numerical diffusion models. The result shows that when the total social benefit of the government is greater than the cost of regulation and the total amount of subsidies, and the additional increase of the income is greater than the actual investment, the system will evolve to be under the government regulation and the firm adoption of service innovation is stable. The proper increase in government regulation, investment subsidies and tax subsidies will help promote the diffusion of service innovation in the system, among which the perception of tax subsidies is the strongest and the subsidy is the weakest. The inhibition coefficient is introduced into the Bass innovation diffusion model and the diffusion model of three service innovations-complementary, competitive and alternative is constructed. The competitive diffusion conforms to the current marketing law of China, and the alternative diffusion will become the trend of future manufacturing enterprises.