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一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值
引用本文:王利明.一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值[J].运筹与管理,2019,28(5):56-60.
作者姓名:王利明
作者单位:1.内蒙古财经大学 统计与数学学院,内蒙古 呼和浩特 010070;2.内蒙古经济数据分析与挖掘重点实验室,内蒙古 呼和浩特 010070
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771025,71661024,71561022);内蒙古自然科学基金资助项目(2017MS0715)
摘    要:讨论一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策,其中局中人通过优先联盟整体参与大联盟的合作,同时优先联盟内部有合取权限结构限制,利用两阶段Shapley值的分配思想并考虑到权限结构对优先联盟内合作的限制,给出了此类合作对策的解。 该解可看做具有联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值的推广。 证明了该解满足的公理化条件,并验证了这些条件的独立性。

关 键 词:合作对策  联盟结构  权限结构  两阶段Shapley值  
收稿时间:2018-09-11

A Two-Step Shapley Value for a Kind of Cooperative Games with Restricted Coalition Structure
WANG Li-ming.A Two-Step Shapley Value for a Kind of Cooperative Games with Restricted Coalition Structure[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2019,28(5):56-60.
Authors:WANG Li-ming
Institution:1.School of Statistics and Mathematics, Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics, Hohhot 010070, China;2.Inner Mongolia key laboratory of economic data analysis and mining, Hohhot 010070, China
Abstract:A kind of cooperative games with restricted coalition structure are discussed, in which players participate in the cooperation of the grand coalition through the priori unions as a whole and there are conjunctive permission structures within the priori unions. A solution to this kind of cooperative games is given by using the two-step Shapley value distribution idea and taking into account the limits of permission structure on cooperation within the priori unions. This solution can be seen as a generalization of the two-step Shapley value for games with coalition structures. The axiomatization conditions of the solution are proved, and the independence of these conditions is verified.
Keywords:cooperative game  coalition structure  permission structure  two-step Shapley value  
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