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社会化媒体环境下不可辩解型产品伤害危机演化博弈研究
引用本文:姜金贵,张琦,沈丹薇,宋艳.社会化媒体环境下不可辩解型产品伤害危机演化博弈研究[J].运筹与管理,2019,28(7):17-25.
作者姓名:姜金贵  张琦  沈丹薇  宋艳
作者单位:1.哈尔滨工程大学 经济管理学院,黑龙江 哈尔滨 150001; 2.东北大学 工商管理学院,辽宁 沈阳 110167; 3.上海外国语大学 国际工商管理学院,上海 200083
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71771061);黑龙江省留学归国人员科学基金项目(LC2016028);黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目(18WWB117);中央高校基本科研业务费专项项目(3072019CFW0921)
摘    要:社会化媒体的普及改变了信息传播模式,使得产品伤害危机的演化发生了变化。针对社会化媒体环境下不可辩解型产品伤害危机构建演化博弈模型,并引入前景理论构建收益矩阵,对社会化媒体环境下不可辩解型产品伤害危机的演化稳定策略进行分析,通过数值仿真发现社会化媒体环境下不可辩解型产品伤害危机演化中存在:损失规避态度的变化对企业-消费者利益损失的影响存在非对称性现象;合理的政府协调补偿会引导企业和消费者进行策略调整,从而有利于危机的快速平息;外界干预对企业-消费者责任性的影响存在非对称性现象,舆论等干预会对企业行为起到责任约束作用。

关 键 词:社会化媒体  产品伤害危机  演化博弈  前景理论  非对称性  
收稿时间:2018-05-17

Evolutionary Game Research into Indefensible ProductHarm Crisis in Social Media Environment
JIANG Jin-gui,ZHANG Qi,SHEN Dan-wei,SONG Yan.Evolutionary Game Research into Indefensible ProductHarm Crisis in Social Media Environment[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2019,28(7):17-25.
Authors:JIANG Jin-gui  ZHANG Qi  SHEN Dan-wei  SONG Yan
Institution:1.School of Economics & Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 15001, China; 2.School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110167, China; 3.School of Business and Management, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai 200083, China
Abstract:The popularity of social media changes the information dissemination model, and makes the evolution of product harm crisis change. This paper builds the evolutionary game model for the indefensible product harm crisis in social media environment, and integrates it into prospect theory to construct benefit matrix. It makes an analysis of evolutionary stability strategy for the indefensible product harm crisis in social media environment. Through the numerical simulation, it is found that the evolution of indefensible product harm crisis in social media environment exists: the change of loss aversion has an asymmetric impact on enterprise and consumer benefit loss; reasonable government compensation can guide both enterprise and consumer in the strategy adjustment, which is conducive to the rapid appeasement of crisis; the external intervention has an asymmetric impact on enterprise-consumer responsibility, and the intervention of public opinion has a responsibility restraint effect on enterprise behavior.
Keywords:social media  product harm crisis  evolutionary game  prospect theory  asymmetry  
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