基于贝叶斯学习的最优互联网化房地产金融合约

房地产金融的互联网化是当前金融市场创新的重要方向。本文采用动态道德风险理论研究了互联网化房地产金融合约的最优性及其经济特征,并以动态合约的视角考虑了参与方的贝叶斯学习对互联网化房地产金融最优性的影响。研究发现,为了激励资信良好的融资方努力工作且排除资信欠佳的融资方,互联网化房地产金融合约不仅需权衡激励成本和收益以确定适当的努力激励强度,而且还需考虑因融资方的信息优势带来的信息租金。

Optimal Internet-based Real Estate Financial Contract Based on Bayesian Learning

The development of Internet finance innovation in real estate finance is an important direction for the current financial market innovation. This paper uses dynamic moral hazard theory to study the optimality and economic characteristics of Internet real estate financial contracts. At the same time, considering the dynamic characteristics of contracts, the article considers the influence of participants' Bayesian learning on the optimality of Internet real estate finance. It is found that, in order to encourage good credit financiers to work hard while excluding bad credit financiers, Internet real estate financial contracts need tonot only tradeoff the incentive costs and benefits to choose the appropriate incentive intensity, but also consider the information rent brought by the information advantages of the financiers.