地方政府竞争、重复建设及其规制政策分析

分权体制下地方政府竞争引发的重复建设和产业同构问题影响了区域经济的协调发展。本文构建了地方政府投资博弈的重复建设模型,并在此基础上探讨使地方政府行为从产业竞争转向合作的激励机制和制度安排。研究发现:在中国垂直的政治管理体制下,中央政府实施对高利润行业征税或者对低利润行业补贴或者两者并举的政策,可以降低重复建设率,且两者并举的双重激励制度效果最优。这些制度安排在保持地方政府发展经济积极性的同时,约束地方政府竞争行为,有利于区域产业体系的完善和区域经济的和谐发展。

An Analysis of Local Governments' Competition, Duplicative Investment and Its Rule Policies

The issue of duplicate investment and industrial isomorphism caused by competition of local government under fiscal decentralization hinders coordinated development of regional economy.We build a game model of duplicate investment and analyze the incentive mechanism and institutional arrangements for the local government to transfer competition to cooperation.Our analysis indicates that,under the vertical political management system,either a tax on high-profit industry or a subsidy on low-profit industry can avoid duplicate investment,and the combined incentive mechanism effects best.These institutional arrangements can keep local governments enthusiastic about economic development.At the same time,they can restrain competitive behaviors of the local government and benefit the perfection of regional industry system and the regional economic harmonious development.