基于零售商过度自信的存货质押博弈决策模型

存货质押是中小企业短期融资的有效手段,而企业对需求的过度自信会影响融资企业和银行的决策,从而影响到企业和银行的预期收益。针对过度自信环境下的存货质押决策问题,建立过度自信零售商和银行的存货质押博弈决策模型,采用Stackelberg博弈分析期望需求和需求波动性两方面过度自信对零售商销售努力、订货量和银行质押率的影响。研究表明:过度自信零售商融资更为激进,过度自信程度越高,对资金需求越大,投入销售努力越高,采购量越大,预期利润与实际利润之间的偏差越大;在低利润市场环境下,质押率随着过度自信的增加而降低,在高利润市场环境下,质押率会随着预测精度过度自信的增加而增加,随着期望需求过度自信的增加而下降。

Game Decision Model of Inventory Financing Based on Overconfidence Retailer

Inventory financing is an effective measure of short-term financing for small and medium-sized enterprises, and the overconfidence of enterprises on demand affects the decisions of financing enterprises and banks, which influence the expected profits of enterprises and banks. Aiming at the problem of inventory financing decision-making in overconfidence environment, a joint decision model of inventory financing is constructed, which consists of the overconfidence retailer and bank. The Stackelberg is adopted to analyze the impact of two kinds of overconfidence degree which includes high estimation of capacity and excessive precision of estimation on the decision variables. It shows that the overconfident retailers are radical on inventory impawn financing, and the retailers' demand on capital, effort and procurement increase with the increase of the degree of overconfidence. Furthermore, it brings deviation between the expected profit and the actual profit. When the market environment is low profit, loan-to-value ratio declines with the increase of the overconfidence degree, and in the lucrative market environment, the loan-to-value ratio declines with the increase of the overconfidence of estimation of capacity, and increases with the increase of the overconfidence of precision of estimation.