“两院制”工程设计审计委托代理博弈分析

为减少业主和设计院之间的信息不对称,本文创新性地构建了一个包括设计院、设计审查院的"两院制"工程设计审计模式。基于委托代理理论对现有设计审计模式和"两院制"设计审计模式进行了博弈分析,给出了这两种模式的最优激励机制。结果发现"两院制"设计审计模式可以减少业主和设计院之间的信息不对称,但只有在审计努力水平达到一定程度后,才能提高业主收益。同时,结果表明信息不对称程度越高、工程风险越大,就越有必要采用"两院制"设计审计模式。

Principal-agent Models for "Bicameral System" Engineering Design Audits

This paper innovatively constructs the "Bicameral System" engineering design audit model,which includes the design institute and the design audit institute,in order to reduce the information asymmetry between the owner and the design institute.By applying the principal-agent theory,two game models and the corresponding optimal incentive mechanisms are constructed.The results show that the design audit can effectively reduce the asymmetry information,but the owner’s income can be improved only when the audit effort level reaches a certain degree.At the same time,the higher the degree of information asymmetry and the engineering risk,the greater the need for the "Bicameral system" engineering design audit.