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连续对策上的计策问题
引用本文:姜殿玉.连续对策上的计策问题[J].运筹与管理,2002,11(2):41-46.
作者姓名:姜殿玉
作者单位:淮海工学院,基础科学系,江苏,连云港,222005
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目 (78970 0 2 5 )
摘    要:限定一个连续对策不是平凡地无意义(例如对某个局中人绝对有利等),我们提出了连续对策上的计策的基本概念。最后得到结论,如果局中人1使用经典对策,那么他的赢得期望必不是赢得函数的最大值。如果局中人1使用计策成功(即使得局中人2中计),那么局中人1必取得赢得函数的最大值,局中人2也有对偶的结果。

关 键 词:连续对策  实质性  计策  佯策  隐蔽策略  中计  识破计策
文章编号:1007-3221(2002)02-0041-06
修稿时间:2001年11月9日

The Trick Problems about a Continuous Game
JIANG Dian-yu.The Trick Problems about a Continuous Game[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2002,11(2):41-46.
Authors:JIANG Dian-yu
Abstract:Assuming that a continuous game is significant,eg.when it is absolutely favorable for one of the two players, we give some basic concepts of tricks on a continuous game. We draw the conclusion: If a player 1 uses the classical game, then his winning expectation is not equal to the greatest value of the winning function. If the player 1 successfully uses a trick,that is, the player 2 is trapped, then the player 1's winning is the greatest value of the winning function. We also have a dual result about the player 2.
Keywords:continuous game  essential game  trick  shame strategy  concealed strategy  trapped  see through a trick
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