公共资产预算配置的拍卖机制设计

本文探讨在财政部门作为政府出资人的框架下,通过设计一套可行的竞标机制来提高预算项目的配置效率。结合运用机制设计理论和拍卖理论与方法建立竞标机制设计模型,在保证竞标预算单位参与投标和真实显示自己效率的条件下最大化拍卖者——政府出资人的期望效用,并通过求解此模型得到最优的竞标机制。鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,给出了第二高得分拍卖这种最优拍卖方式。最后对公共资产配置预算的规则如何确定才能减少效率损失进行了归纳。

On Mechanism Design of Auction in Public Asset Budgeting

Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the mechanism design of auction in public asset budgeting. Auction is an effective means of resource allocation and mechanism of price revealed. In this paper, by the use of mechanism design theory and auction theory, we explore a feasible mechanism to improve the allocation efficiency of public asset by the assumption that the government auctions budgetary projects. The auction model we develop is based on the incentive mechanism design approach assuring that the bidders satisfy the conditions of incentive-compatibility constraints and express their true preferences and efficiencies to maximize the utility of government budgetary control. The optimal auction mechanism could be reached when we find the solution of the model. The optimal scoring rules auction is also analyzed considered the complexities of the expression of optimal mechanism. We finally conclude the budgetary rules in practice.