再制造供应链“投保策略”运营模式研究:谁应来投“产品质量保险”？

以汽车零部件制造业为研究背景,运用斯坦伯格博弈,探析了在制造和再制造双供应链寡头竞争中,采用为再制造品购买“产品质量保险”这一促销策略时,再制造供应链参与者“谁应来投保”的问题。依据集体生产者责任(CPR)理论,“投保策略”的实施模式可分为两种:(1)再制造商主导投保;(2)再制造品零售商主导投保。根据消费者行为研究,构造了反映投保策略的需求函数,并针对投保者不同,探究了两种投保模式的可取条件及其最优利润。研究表明:从整个再制造供应链效益来看,再制造商主导投保模式恒优于零售商主导投保模式;但若两种模式同时可取,再制造商及其零售商均会消极投保,以期谋求“搭便车”收益,此时再制造商可在一定范围内提高收益出让比率以促进零售商投保,否则再制造商应积极主导投保。

Study on the Operation Mode of Remanufacturing Supply Chain: Who Should Purchase “Product Quality Insurance”?

Against the background of auto parts manufacturing industry, two competitive supply chains with the production and marketing of new spare parts and remanufactured parts are constructed. The main purpose of this paper is to explore who should purchase “Product Quality Insurance” for remanufactured parts by using Stackelberg game model. According to the theory of CPR(collective producer responsibility), the purchasing insurance strategy can be divided into two modes for different dominants: (1)the remanufacturer directly purchasing insurance mode (i.e. IM mode); (2)the retailer agenting to purchase insurance mode(i.e. IR mode). According to relative researches of consumer behavior, the demand functions reflecting two different modes are constructed. Further, the application conditions and optimal economic benefits of IM mode and mode IM are respectively calculated. The results indicate the IM mode is always better than the IM mode. However, when the IM mode and themode are both reasonable, the remanufacturer and retailer will be negative to purchasing insurance for attempting to obtain “free rider” benefits. The effective coordination strategy is to make the remanufacturer raise profit-sharing ratio to a certain extent to guarantee the implementation of IM mode, otherwise it adopts the IM mode.