基于有信息委托人视角的创意转化契约设计研究

为了形式化一个有信息的委托人在创意的转化过程中,与代理人缔约时所面临的信号显示问题,以创意的特性为基础,通过建立Stackelberg信号博弈模型,证明了创意转化契约分离均衡的存在性,并分析了知识产权保护强度和产业成熟度对均衡契约的影响。研究还发现,当同时存在委托人的逆向选择和代理人的道德风险时,分离均衡契约使得代理人的努力水平会产生向下的扭曲。

Research on Design of Creative Idea Transaction Contract Based on the Viewpoint of an Informed Principal

In order to formalize the signaling revelation problem facing an informed principal and an agent when they sign a contract in the process of creative idea transaction, this paper demonstrates the separate equilibrium existing in contract of creative idea transaction by establishing a Stackelberg signal game model, which is based on the features of creative idea, and an analysis on the effects that the intellectual property protection environment and the industrial maturity respectively have on the equilibrium contract is also made in this research. It is also found that the separating equilibrium contract makes the agent’s efforts distorted downward when adverse selection of the principal and moral hazard of the agent coexist.