| 多任务委托-代理关系中电信服务提供商的激励机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李雷,忻展红.多任务委托-代理关系中电信服务提供商的激励机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2007,16(6):152-156. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李雷 忻展红 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京,100876 |
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| 摘 要： | 由于电信运营商和电信服务提供商(SP)之间存在利益冲突和信息不对称,很容易导致SP的违规行为。电信运营商和SP之间的关系属于多任务的委托-代理关系。在设计委托-代理激励合同时,从三个任务的角度考虑了电信运营商对SP的激励,并通过该模型分析了服务质量和信誉等级对SP的重要性。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息经济学 委托代理 多任务分析 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-3221（2007）06-0152-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-07-20 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年7月20日 |
The Study on the Multi-Task Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider |
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| LI Lei,XIN Zhan-hong.The Study on the Multi-Task Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2007,16(6):152-156. |
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| Authors: | LI Lei XIN Zhan-hong |
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| Abstract: | There are many conflicts and asymmetric information between the telecom operators and the service providers,which easily results in the violations of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators and the service providers is multi-task principal-agent.Through the research for three tasks,the incentive for the service provider is considered in the design of the principal-agent incentive contract,and it is very improtant for the service provider to improve service quality and credit rating. |
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| Keywords: | information economics principal-agent multi-task analyse incentive mechanism |
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