考虑声誉效应的众包竞赛动态激励机制研究

将声誉效应引入众包竞赛的激励机制可以促使接包方为考虑未来绩效收益而提高当前努力。建立并求解了显性和隐性声誉效应下连续两个任务阶段的动态激励模型,探讨了显性声誉修正系数、隐性声誉系数以及参赛者数量对激励效果的影响,并与无声誉激励机制进行了对比。研究表明,声誉激励机制通过单位绩效激励强度和固定奖励水平两条途径起作用,增大隐性声誉系数有助于提高每个任务阶段的努力程度,显性声誉不确定性则会降低第2任务阶段的努力程度;各种条件下实施声誉激励对第1任务阶段中的努力程度和单位绩效奖励的影响存在不确定性;参赛者数量的增加有助于弱化第1任务阶段中棘轮效应,但也会降低声誉激励机制对努力程度的正向价值,扩大声誉激励机制对单位绩效奖励的负向价值。

Research on Dynamic Incentive Mechanism of Competitive Crowdsourcing under the Consideration of Reputation Effect

Introducing the reputation mechanism into the incentive mechanism of crowdsourcing contest can encourage the crowdsourcees to improve their current efforts under the consideration of future performance gains. Therefore, a dynamic incentive model of two consecutive task stages under explicit and implicit reputation effects is established and solved. The influences of explicit reputation correction coefficient, implicit reputation coefficient and the number of participants are discussed and compared with the incentive mechanism which reputation is not considered. The research shows that the reputation incentive mechanism works through the two modes of unit performance incentive intensity and fixed reward level. Increasing the implicit reputation coefficient helps to improve the level of effort at each stage of the task, the uncertainty of explicit reputation decreases the effort in the second task stage. The impact of the implementation of reputation incentive in various situations on the effort level and unit performance incentive in the first task stage contains uncertainty; the increasing number of participants helps to weaken ratchet effect in the first task cycle, but to deduce positive value of the reputation incentive mechanism to the extent of the effort and then to expand the negative value of the reputation incentive mechanism to the unit performance reward.