损失规避环境下供应链回扣联合促销决策研究

在由单一供应商和单一损失规避零售商组成的二阶段供应链中,基于Stackelberg博弈模型,研究零售商回扣与订单联合决策以及供应商渠道销量回扣决策,试图揭示分散决策供应链回扣联合促销机制。研究表明,给定供应商实施渠道销量回扣促销,零售商回扣与损失规避呈正向变动关系,而零售商渠道传导率与损失规避的关系依赖于产品获利情况,渠道销量回扣能提高零售商回扣与零售商期望效用;而供应商实施渠道销量回扣促销的意愿与批发价有关,只有当批发价大于某一阈值时,才能促使供应商和零售商实现回扣联合促销;但供应商实施渠道销量回扣总是能提高供应链效率。

A Study of Joint Promotions of Supply Chain Rebates under Loss-Averse Scenarios

Considering a dyadic supply chain consisting of one supplier and one loss-averse retailer,the retailer’s joint rebate and ordering decisions and the supplier’s scanback decision are examined basedon Stackelberg game,so as to uncover the joint-promotion mechanisim of rebates under decentralized setting.Our research first shows that the retailer rebate is increasing in loss aversion,the monotonicity of the pass-through rate in the degree of loss aversion depends on the proit margin,and the retailer rebate and the retailer5 s expected utility can be improved,given the supplier offering scanback trade promotions.Another important result is to illustrate that the supplier would like to offer scanbacks only when the wholesale price is larger than the threshold value,leading to joint promotions for the supplier and the retailer.Finally,the supply chain efficiency can be always improved by the supplier’s scanback incentives.