| 供应链中共享信息精度的激励研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 樊敏,艾兴政.供应链中共享信息精度的激励研究[J].运筹与管理,2006,15(3):71-74,98. |
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| 作者姓名： | 樊敏 艾兴政 |
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| 作者单位： | 电子科技大学,管理学院,四川,成都,610054 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对供应链中信息共享价值的重要性和道德风险和逆向选择并存的不对称信息问题，本文运用一个道德风险之前的逆向选择的混合模型研究了制造商如何激励零售商分享其私人精确的市场信息，并相应提出了解决此问题的最优契约。
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| 关 键 词： | 共享信息 道德风险 逆向选择 激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-3221（2006）03-0071-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 09 9 2005 12:00AM |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-09-09 |
Study on Incentives of Sharing Information Precision in Supply Chain |
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| FAN Min,AI Xing-zheng.Study on Incentives of Sharing Information Precision in Supply Chain[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2006,15(3):71-74,98. |
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| Authors: | FAN Min AI Xing-zheng |
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| Institution: | Vniversity of Electronic sience and Technology, chengdu 610054, China |
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| Abstract: | Aimed at the importance of the value of sharing information and the issue of asymmetric information on both adverse selection and moral hazard in supply chain, this paper studies how the manufacturer provides an incentive to the retailer so as to share the precise market information of its own and accordingly designs an optimal contract employing a mixed model of adverse selection before moral hazard. |
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| Keywords: | sharing information moral hazard adverse selection incentives |
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