| 凸随机合作对策的核心 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘微,高作峰,张晓玲,张海峰.凸随机合作对策的核心[J].运筹与管理,2005,14(5):59-62. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘微 高作峰 张晓玲 张海峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 燕山大学,理学院,河北秦皇岛066004 |
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| 基金项目： | 河北省自然科学基金资助项目（A2005000301）;河北省教育厅资助项目（2004468） |
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| 摘 要： | 本文将凸性扩展到随机合作对策中,从而得到凸随机合作对策具有超可加性与非空的核心,且凸随机合作对策的核心满足Minkowski和与Minkowski差.
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| 关 键 词： | 随机合作对策 核心 Minkowski和 凸性 随机变量 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-3221(2005)05-0059-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 12 25 2004 12:00AM |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年12月25 |
Core of Convex Stochastic Cooperative Game |
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| LIU Wei, GAO Zuo-feng, ZHANG Xiao-ling,ZHANG Hai-feng.Core of Convex Stochastic Cooperative Game[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2005,14(5):59-62. |
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| Authors: | LIU Wei GAO Zuo-feng ZHANG Xiao-ling ZHANG Hai-feng |
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| Institution: | College of Science, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper extends notions of superadditivity and convexity to stochastic cooperative games. It is shown that convex games are superadditive and have nonempty cores, and that the core of convex stochastic cooperative game satisfies the Minkowski sum and Minkowski difference. |
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| Keywords: | stochastic cooperative game core Minkowski sum convexity stochastic variety |
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