基于公平关切的双渠道低碳供应链博弈分析

以制造商为主导的双渠道低碳供应链中,在制造商、零售商为公平中性、零售商具有公平关切以及制造商具有公平关切3种情形下,分别对比分析单位低碳产品碳减排量、零售商销售努力程度、公平关切程度对制造商、零售商决策及效用的影响.研究发现:在制造商主导的供应链中,无论哪一方具有公平关切,也不论公平关切程度大小,制造商大多是获利方;公平关切行为不会带来定价变动趋势的变化;单位碳减排量越大或者零售商销售努力程度越高,则制造商对零售商的批发价格越高,如果零售商具有一定的公平关切,则批发价格上涨幅度会得到一定程度的有效控制;制造商、零售商的效益相互依赖,当零售商销售努力程度上升时,制造商的效用也会增加;当零售商不愿为低碳产品的销售付出努力时,制造商具有公平关切情形下零售商的损失反而较小.

Game Analysis of Two-Channel Low-Carbon Supply Chain Based on Equity Concerns

Dominated by manufacturers of double channel low carbon supply chain,for fair and neutral in manufacturers,retailers,and retailers have fairness concerns and manufacturers have fairness concerns three kinds of cases,respectively,contrast analysis unit low carbon product carbon emissions reductions,degree of retailers’ sales efforts,a fair degree of concern of manufacturers and retailers decision-making and the influence of the utility.The study found that:In the supply chain of manufacturers dominate,no matter which side has the fairness concern,no matter a fair degree of concern about size,manufacturers are mostly profit;Fair concern behavior will not bring changes in pricing trends;The larger the carbon emission per unit or the higher the retailer’s sales effort,the higher the manufacturer’s wholesale price will be.If the retailer has some fair concerns,the increase of wholesale price will be effectively controlled to some extent.The benefits of the manufacturer and the retailer depend on each other.When the retailer makes more efforts to sell,the utility of the manufacturer will increase.When retailers are reluctant to make an effort to sell low-carbon products,they lose less when manufacturers are concerned about fairness.