A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Chemical, Metallurgical and Materials Engineering, College of Engineering and Technology, Botswana International University of Science and Technology, Plot 10071 Boseja Ward, Private Bag 16, Palapye, Botswana.;2. Air Liquide Gas Company, Cnr Andre Marais & Old Vereenging streets, Alrode 1451, South Africa;3. Department of Civil and Chemical Engineering, University of South Africa, Private Bag X6, Johannesburg, South Africa |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we generalize Green and Laffont’s (1979) impossibility theorem to the following form: in quasi-linear environments, when the set of each agent’s types is sufficiently rich, we cannot find mechanisms that allow bounded deviations from the decisive efficiency, incentive compatibility and budget-balance at the same time. Hence, it is impossible to find an incentive compatible mechanism with minimum social welfare losses. Furthermore, we discuss the compatibility problems between incentive and individual rights in a quasi-linear environment (see Sen, 1970a,b; Deb et al., 1997). Specifically, some new impossibility results are established. |
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