Charity auctions for the happy few |
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| Institution: | 1. Key Laboratory of Tectonics and Petroleum Resources, Ministry of Education, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan, 430074, China;2. Tianjin Branch of China National Offshore Oil Company Ltd, Tianjin, 300452, China;3. State Key Laboratory of Petroleum Resources and Prospecting, China University of Petroleum, Changping, Beijing, 102249, China;1. EPEE, University of Evry-Val-D’Essonne, France;2. IPAG Business School, CNRS, Paris School of Economics, VCREME, France;3. Toulouse School of Economics, INRA, VCREME, France;1. Department of Neurology, Dicle University School of Medicine, Diyarbakir, Turkey;2. Department of Biostatistics and Medical Informatics, Dicle University School of Medicine, Diyarbakir, Turkey |
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| Abstract: | Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than either winner-pay auctions or lotteries. We demonstrate that first-price and second-price winner-pay auctions have a better revenue performance than first-price and second-price all-pay auctions when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. Lotteries can also provide higher revenue than all-pay auctions. To prove this, we consider a framework with complete information. Complete information is helpful and may reflect events that occur, for instance, in a local service club (such as a voluntary organization) or at a show-business dinner. |
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