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Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games
Authors:Janos Flesch  Frank Thuijsman  Koos Vrieze
Institution:1. Department of Mathematics, University of Limburg, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Abstract:We examine a three-person stochastic game where the only existing equilibria consist of cyclic Markov strategies. Unlike in two-person games of a similar type, stationary ε-equilibria (ε > 0) do not exist for this game. Besides we characterize the set of feasible equilibrium rewards.
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