Equilibria in load balancing games |
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Authors: | Bo Chen |
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Institution: | [1]Qufu Normal University, Shandong 273165, China [2]Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, CV47AL, UK |
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Abstract: | A Nash equilibrium (NE) in a multi-agent game is a strategy profile that is resilient to unilateral deviations. A strong Nash
equilibrium (SE) is one that is stable against coordinated deviations of any coalition. We show that, in the load balancing
games, NEs approximate SEs in the sense that the benefit of each member of any coalition from coordinated deviations is well
limited. Furthermore, we show that an easily recognizable special subset of NEs exhibit even better approximation of SEs. |
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Keywords: | Nash equilibrium load balancing approximation |
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