A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel |
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| Authors: | Chih Chang Cheng-Cheng Hu |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Department of Mathematics,National Tsing Hua University,Hsinchu,Taiwan;2.Department of Economics,National Cheng Kung University,Tainan,Taiwan |
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| Abstract: | The purpose of the paper is to propose a bargaining game to interpret the kernel non-cooperatively. Based on the idea of the Davis-Maschler reduced game, a bilateral bargaining procedure is provided in our game model. We show that the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of our non-cooperative game coincides with the kernel for transferable utility games. |
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